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This chapter explains how feminists have sought to understand the sex of sexual 
violence, particularly rape. These debates are centrally about the nature of heterosex 
in patriarchy, but they are also inextricably about the nature and structure of 
feminism itself, from the consciousness-raising speak outs of the Women’s 
Liberation Movement, to the relationship of feminism to the state. Whilst rape is, of 
course, a material reality, it is also a discourse (Gavey 2005): how we experience 
rape is at least partly determined by how we are able to understand it. The language 
of rape (Ehrlich 2001) constructs a field in and through which experiences of rape – 
particularly but not exclusively the experiences of female victim/survivors and male 
perpetrators – can/not be understood and therefore actioned. Thus, feminist theory 
and research around rape and sexual violence, although most typically located in the 
social sciences, do not only reside there, and much important work has come from 
other disciplinary traditions, particular those that study representation. 
 
In the context of this volume, it should go without saying that feminist activism, 
research and theory have been genuinely groundbreaking and life-changing in the 
ways in which they have documented and challenged rape and other forms of sexual 
violence. At its best, feminist work has done this in a way which has centred 
victim/survivors, allowed for varied experiences to be heard and understood, and 
provided practical support and advocacy. Within feminist debate, there is a clear 
understanding that women’s experiences of sexual violence are both diverse and 
connected. Diverse in range - from one-off violent acts, to repeated, routinised 
instances of sexual violence, assault and harassment across a lifetime – these are 
nevertheless connected points on what Liz Kelly (1988) influentially called the 
continuum of sexual violence. This continuum exists both within any individual 
woman’s lifetime and connects different women’s experiences under patriarchy, 
even as these experiences are differentiated in relation to overarching socio-political 
structures (e.g. in conditions of war or systems of slavery) as well as through the 
intersections of gender with other structural forms of oppression such as race, 
dis/ability, age or sexuality. This is the ground on which this chapter is built, but my 
focus here is more narrowly to survey feminist debates about the sex of sexual 
violence.  
 
Although this chapter adopts a structure which is broadly chronological – moving 
from an analysis of rape as violence-not-sex originating in the 1970s, through to a 
reconsideration of the sex of sexual violence from the 1980s onwards – this is by no 
means a strictly linear movement. I am writing this in 2018, around the first 
anniversary of the publication of sexual assault allegations against Hollywood 
producer Harvey Weinstein. Since Jodi Kantor and Megan Twohey’s New York 
Times article was published in October 2017, barely a day has gone by without a 
linked media story. Feminism – or more accurately, a popular understanding of 
feminism – is the ground on which much of the coverage of the Weinstein case, and 
the subsequent explosion of survivor discourse under the banner #MeToo, has been 
constructed. It therefore provides useful examples, throughout this chapter, for 
working through some of the tensions in the way that feminists have engaged with 
questions about the sex of sexual violence.  
 Violence not sex  
 
A view still commonly attributed to feminists in popular discourse around rape is that 
rape is about violence not sex. This formulation seems to have its origins in Susan 
Brownmiller’s Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (first published in 1975), or - 
perhaps more accurately – in the way the arguments of the book were taken up both 
in feminist campaigning and in popular discourse. Tellingly, in the personal 
statement which prefaces Against Our Will, Brownmiller positions herself as “a 
woman who changed her mind about rape” (1986, p.9). Brownmiller’s trajectory, as 
sketched in these few pages, is from being a journalist “who viewed a rape case with 
suspicion”, who then listened sceptically to friends’ accounts of rape, before her 
“moment of revelation” at a public speak-out on rape (1986, pp.7-9).  
 
This context is important as it highlights the extent to which the violence-not-sex 
analysis is a reactive one, emerging from a context in which rape is not taken 
seriously, and women’s stories are not heard or believed. Louise Armstrong – whose 
work on incest I will return to shortly – notes that early second-wave feminists 
developed their analysis of men’s violence against women and girls in a context 
where that violence was variously “permitted” or “denied” (1996, p. 17). So, for 
instance, at the time Brownmiller’s book was written – and indeed, into the 1990s in 
both the US and UK – men could not be charged with the rape of women they were 
married to. The marital rape exemption was based on an historical understanding of 
women as men’s property, and a man was permitted to do as he liked with his 
property. This notion of women as chattel has not entirely gone away;  this idea 
permeates many accounts of violence against women in prostitution where the 
man’s purchase is deemed to license his actions (or “permit”, in Armstrong’s phrase), 
and the woman’s acceptance of payment is suggested to invalidate the possibility of 
abuse. The denial of abuse, on the other hand, is the reconstruction of an abuse 
narrative to mean something else. Armstrong’s example here is Freud’s re-writing of 
the evidence of incest presented by his female patients, which he reconstructed as 
fantasy-not-abuse (1996, pp.16-17). Together, these examples demonstrate that the 
feminist framing of rape as violence-not-sex was (and is) a response to a context in 
which rape was seen only as sex, based on its meaning for men and ignoring the 
experiences of the women and children they abused. This context is now typically 
referred to by feminists as a rape culture (Buchwald, Fletcher & Roth 1993) and, 
indeed, this is a term which has gained popular currency in English-language news 
media since the early 2010s (Phillips 2017). 
 
In her helpful overview of feminist theorisations of rape, Rebecca Whisnant (2017) 
suggests that feminists moved on from the violence-not-sex position fairly quickly as 
its limitations became clear. The most significant of these limitations was that 
emphasising violence and, relatedly, injury, reified popular misconceptions of rape as 
a rare and extreme crime. This downplayed much of what feminists had learned from 
the speak-outs, both about the everyday, routinised nature of much rape and sexual 
assault and about women’s strategies for survival. The construction of rape as a 
crime of violence-not-sex was also one that many women struggled to square with 
their own experiences and, as Catharine MacKinnon (1981) argued, downplayed the 
interconnectedness of violence and (hetero)sex in a patriarchal context. 
 
However, Whisnant perhaps understates the extent to which the violence-not-sex 
position influenced the development of service provision for victim/survivors and the 
wider popular discourse about rape. For example, in her ongoing work on the history 
of the feminist anti-violence movement in Scotland, Jenny Wartnaby demonstrates 
that the emphasis on rape as a crime of violence – not sex – permeated materials 
produced by local rape crisis centres in the early 1980s.i Partially responding to 
critiques outlined above, there was a broadening out of violence-not-sex to power-
not-sex in certain contexts. Although there are important distinctions between these 
positions, for my purposes here it is the fact that they are united in constructing 
sexual violence as not sex that is most significant. Nor is this an historical curiosity: 
this formulation is still very much in use in frontline services, often in the context of 
challenging rape myths. Similarly, the violence (or power) not sex formulation was in 
evidence in some feminist responses to the allegations against Harvey Weinstein. 
Here, the insistence this was not about sex was a means of insisting on the 
seriousness of his actions against a cultural context that had for decades condoned 
his abuse (as just sex). It was also an understandable response to Weinstein’s own 
initial statement in relation to the allegations in which he presented himself as a man 
out-of-touch with changing sexual mores, attempting to reframe the story as one 
about sexual morality and conduct, not violence and the abuse of power.  
 
One of the enduring legacies of the violence-not-sex framing is the emphasis on the 
trauma of rape and the positioning of women as victims, not survivors. Again, these 
legacies have played out in responses to the women accusing Weinstein as well as 
the many millions more who asserted #MeToo in autumn 2017. With a wide range of 
male behaviour under scrutiny, this has been – in many ways – a moment when the 
feminist analysis of the continuum of men’s violences has been at the forefront, as I 
discuss in the next section. At the same time, a popular discourse in which “real” 
rape (Estrich 1987) and sexual assault are always and only devastating (and, so, 
rare), clashes with the assertion that rape and sexual assault take many forms and 
are depressingly routine - something feminists have been documenting for decades, 
but which has taken on a new urgency in light of #MeToo. These tensions have, for 
instance, played out in the circulation of photographs of Rose McGowan and Ashley 
Judd with Weinstein after he had allegedly assaulted them. Stereotypical ideas about 
“real” rape do not map onto these glamorous red carpet photographs and have been 
used by Weinstein supporters (and, indeed, by his legal team) to cast doubt on the 
rape narratives. The logic here seems to be that because the women are pictured 
smiling with Weinstein at public events, they can’t possibly be “real” victims of sexual 
abuse at his hands. Their survival in and of itself places their account in doubt, but 
their continued existence in the glamorous and sexualised realm of Hollywood is 
even more troubling: because they publicly present themselves in this sexualised 
context, doubt is cast on their account of violence. Sexualisation trumps violence, as 
feminists working on rape representation in mainstream media have documented for 
decades (e.g. Estrich 1987, Benedict 1992, Boyle 2005). 
 
It is important to be clear that I in no way want to minimise the trauma, as well as 
physical or economic harms, that many women experience as a result of rape or 
other forms of sexual assault. Nor do I want to suggest that there is no longer a need 
to speak of this trauma in the public sphere. Given the shame which continues to 
adhere to sexual victimisation, speaking out remains important both for (some) 
individual survivors and for any feminist understanding of – and response to – rape 
and other forms of sexual assault. What I am reacting against here is, instead, a 
universalising narrative around rape trauma which is the legacy of the emphasis on 
violence. If rape is consistently presented as the worst possible thing that could 
happen to a woman then women’s survival and ability to speak out is automatically 
suspect. Moreover, this is simultaneously an individualising narrative with personal 
and psychological – not social, political, cultural - solutions. 
 
This is brilliantly illustrated by Louise Armstrong in her book Rocking the Cradle of 
Sexual Politics: What Happened When Women Said Incest (1996). Armstrong was 
among the first women in the US to speak publicly about incest – or more accurately, 
to speak and be heard (1996, p.2) - and her 1978 book Kiss Daddy Goodnight was 
foundational. In the Rocking the Cradle of Sexual Politics, Armstrong explores how, 
in the intervening years, the public silence (and silencing) of the issue was 
transformed into apparently endless noise. Incest – particularly in its most 
sensational and unusual forms (its most recognisably violent and injurious forms) – 
increasingly came to occupy centre stage in media contexts from talk shows to soap 
operas. These media treatments, she notes, were not only sensationalist but, 
crucially, consistently emphasised personal trauma and enduring psychological 
impacts. Her argument is that this diffused the specifically feminist analysis at the 
heart of the original speak-outs on the issue: the understanding that by sharing 
experiences, women were forging a structural analysis of their position in a 
patriarchal society (1996, p. 11). As Armstrong memorably argues, as the issue was 
more widely taken up, this feminist recognition that the personal is political was lost. 
No longer part of a wider feminist analysis, the emphasis was simply on the 
imperative to speak: “the personal is – the public”, as though publicity was the end in 
itself (1996, p.3). Subsequently, the emphasis on therapy effected yet another 
transformation: “The personal is - the personal” (1996, p.38).  
 
Armstrong’s work is a salutary reminder of the double-edged sword of speaking out 
in a heavily mediated context. Her writing also raises important questions about what 
gets lost with the emphasis on the sensational and devastating. As feminist research 
in this area continually emphasises, there is no one way – and certainly no right way 
- to survive rape, and a universalising narrative can make it more difficult for some 
women to name their own experiences and so to seek appropriate support and 
redress (Estrich 1987, Gavey 2005). However, the development of feminist research 
and theory around men’s violence against women has – in different ways – also 
retained the legacy of the violence-not-sex position. Although violence and crime are 
not synonymous, the “focus on crime” – which Liz Kelly (2012, p. xix) identifies in 
feminist interventions from the late 1980s onwards – can be understood as part of 
the same reaction against the routine minimisation of women’s experiences and the 
insistence on taking them seriously. For Kelly, one of the consequences of this 
emphasis has been that “research, policy and practice has concentrated on intimate 
partner violence and, to a lesser extent, sexual assault” (2012, p. xix) meaning that 
the “everyday, routine intimate intrusions” which women experience largely slipped 
from the agenda. And there are other implications antithetical to a feminist politics. 
Alison Phipps (2014, p.41), for example, argues that international activism on 
violence against women – couched in the language of crime – can be co-opted in a 
neoconservative rhetoric to justify culturally, politically and economically imperialist 
projects. In a similar vein, Kristin Bumiller (2008) explores the ways in which feminist 
anti-violence movements have become publicly and politically associated with crime 
control, something which has racialized implications, particularly in a US context.  
 
Arguing that rape is violence-not-sex has been – and is – an important strategy for 
insisting on the (criminal) significance of rape and the necessity of focusing on 
women’s experiences of what men experience as sex in contexts where rape is 
permitted and/or denied. It remains the case that when something is seen as “sex” it 
is very difficult to at the same time insist that it is also violence: sex makes violence 
invisible as such. In my own research, the clearest examples I have found of this are 
in the way the porn industry talks about the abuse of female performers. The industry 
is more than willing to acknowledge that its production practices are abusive. 
However, by framing these narratives as sex – and as sex to which the women 
consent – any harm is rendered invisible; harm becomes, instead, part of the sexual 
appeal of porn itself (Boyle 2011).  
 
Nonetheless, as I have demonstrated in this section, the legacy of the violence-not-
sex approach has been to leave marginalised many women’s experiences of rape 
which do not – or do not straight-forwardly – fit this model, and to emphasise crime 
and state-responses. In the next section, I will explore how and why feminists put 
sex back into sexual violence. 
 
 
The violence of (hetero)sex 
 
If one of the reasons for feminist framing of rape as violence not sex was to overturn 
the dominant understanding of rape as experienced by men (in other words, as sex), 
then it may seem counterintuitive that the sex of sexual violence was to become so 
central to feminist approaches from the 1980s onwards. Catherine MacKinnon – one 
of the key theorists of the sex of rape – clarifies the feminist rationale for this shift 
perfectly however. MacKinnon argues that by seeing rape as violence-not-sex “we 
fail to criticize what has been made of sex, what has been done to us through sex, 
because we leave the line between rape and intercourse, sexual harassment and 
sex roles, pornography and eroticism right where it is” (1981/1987, pp.86-87). For 
MacKinnon, it is important for feminists to understand the sex of sexual violence 
because sexual violence is a large part of what (hetero)sex means – to women as 
well as to men - in a patriarchal context. Part of the evidence that MacKinnon and 
others have drawn on in developing these arguments is the testimonies of 
victim/survivors who have experienced the violence done to them as sexual, with 
sometimes enduring implications for the ways in which they experience sex. 
However, this argument does not solely hinge on victim/survivor experience. Rather, 
it asks us to consider how heterosex is made meaningful in the context of unequal 
gender relations in patriarchal contexts. This means understanding certain 
commonalities between “what has been made of” consensual heterosex and sexual 
violence, as well as considering the ways in which socio-cultural understandings of 
heterosex and gender roles more broadly provide the ground on which sexual 
violence occurs. In exploring these arguments in this section, I will draw upon Liz 
Kelly’s work on the continuum of sexual violence (1988) and, in considering the 
broader contexts in which we all make sense of sexual violence, gesture towards her 
later work which explores the conducive context (2005) contemporary societies 
provide for sexual violence.  
 
First, however, a caveat: it is not only women who are victim/survivors of sexual 
violence, nor is it the case that sexual assault is exclusive to heterosexual contexts. 
Measuring sexual violence incidence and prevalence is notoriously fraught but a 
consistent pattern which does emerge across time and place is that sexual violence 
is disproportionately experienced by women and perpetrated by men (Walby et al 
2017). A feminist analysis is first and foremost about seeing these as gendered 
patterns: to paraphrase MacKinnon, sexual violence exists because of what has 
been made of gender. As R.W. Connell argues: 
Most men do not attack or harass women; but those who do are unlikely to 
think themselves deviant. On the contrary they usually feel they are entirely 
justified, that they are exercising a right. They are authorized by an ideology 
of supremacy (1995, p.83). 
In other words, violence against women is entirely compatible with how masculinity, 
and heterosexual masculinity specifically, is personally, politically, culturally and 
socially enacted. Although Brownmiller is often credited with advocating the 
“violence-not-sex” position, her understanding of rape as linked to gendered power 
relations is consistent with this approach. For Brownmiller, after all, rape is “nothing 
more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all 
women in a state of fear” (1986, p.15).   
 
In this context, it is not only men who experience sexual violence as sexual: women 
too have come to understand an inextricable link between (hetero)sex and violence. 
Here I want to turn to Liz Kelly’s (1988) influential work on women’s experiences of 
sexual violence in which she argues that the pervasive nature of men’s sexual 
violence means that women make sense of individual actions in relation to a 
continuum of related experiences across a lifetime. For Kelly, the continuum can 
allow us to identify a “basic common character that underlies many different events” 
and/or “a continuous series of elements or events that pass into one another and 
cannot be readily distinguished” (1988, p.76). Importantly, Kelly’s research points to 
the way that experiences that the women in her study did not necessarily define as 
sexual violence were essential elements of this continuum, shaping how they did 
understand more readily recognisable acts of sexual violence. Kelly’s work decentres 
legalistic definitions to instead emphasise women’s understandings of their 
experiences, including the ways in which women make sense of sexual violence in 
relation to their experiences and expectations of gender and (hetero)sexuality. This 
can mean understanding rape on a continuum with other sexual experiences: a 
continuum of choice and coercion.  
 
This understanding of the continuum has, for instance, underpinned work on forced 
marriage by Sundari Anitha and Aisha Gill (2009). Anitha and Gill (2009, p.165) refer 
to consent and coercion in relation to marriage as “two ends of a continuum, 
between which lie degrees of socio-cultural expectation, control, persuasion, 
pressure, threat and force”. As with the research which led Kelly to propose the 
continuum (1988), Anitha and Gill are able to highlight important connections 
between women’s everyday experiences – of constraints on marital consent – and 
criminal, violent acts against them. They are concerned with dismantling binary ways 
of thinking which have disadvantaged women (not least in the legal system) when 
their experiences have occupied a “grey area” in-between coercion and consent.  
 
How feminists name and conceptualise experiences which fall in these “grey areas” 
remains a live question. If an act fits a legal definition of rape, for instance, to what 
extent is it helpful for feminists to insist on using the language of rape even if women 
themselves do not think of it in that way? Many feminist theorists now use a range of 
terms which are more organic to women’s lived experiences.  For instance, in her 
book Just Sex: The Cultural Scaffolding of Rape, for which Nicole Gavey draws on a 
number of studies with women about their experiences of sexual violence and of sex, 
Gavey deploys a range of different terms to capture the complexities in the ways 
women narrate these experiences. These terms include: forced sex, unwanted sex, 
coerced sex, unjust sex, obligatory sex and sort-of-rape. This is not to say these 
experiences are not also rape, but to recognise that conceptualising them only 
through a criminal lens does not necessarily do justice to women’s experiences, 
particularly when these involve known men.  
 
Fiona Vera-Gray’s recent work on street harassment is similarly concerned with “the 
project of defining the world from women’s phenomenological position” (2016, p.2). 
Vera-Gray is interested in women’s daily experiences – precisely the kind of 
experiences the emphasis on violence and crime can obscure – and this leads her to 
reconceptualise street harassment as intrusion and, specifically, men’s intrusion. It 
may seem surprising that by centring women’s daily, lived experiences Vera-Gray 
chooses a language that centres men’s behaviour. However, Vera-Gray notes that in 
a context where women learn to see ourselves as sexual objects, intrusions such as 
catcalling may at times be experienced as wanted or desired: this does not, she 
argues, mean that they cannot also have negative impacts (2016, p.7). She argues, 
“in practicing intrusion [men] are unaware of whether particular practices are wanted 
by individual women” (ibid). In other words, she focuses on the sense of (sexual) 
entitlement underpinning men’s behaviour in contexts where consent is never 
sought, and on the routine adjustments women make to their own behaviour to 
manage, ameliorate and avoid these behaviours. 
 
It is important to note here that in Kelly’s original conceptualisation of the continuum 
she is clear that placing women’s experiences on a continuum is not intended to 
establish a hierarchy of seriousness or injury (with the exception of sexual murder). 
Echoing Vera-Gray’s work, popular discussions around the #MeToo movement have 
similarly demonstrated that sexual harassment does not need to involve physical 
violence or sexual assault for it to have both material and psychological impacts. 
Speaking on the BBC panel show Have I Got News For You (3 November 2017), 
comedian Jo Brand captured this point beautifully in her response to a male 
panellist’s dismissive comment that emerging abuse allegations in the Westminster 
Parliament were not “high level crimes”: 
I know it’s not high level, but it doesn’t have to be high level for women 
to feel under siege in somewhere like the House of Commons. And 
actually, for women, if you’re constantly being harassed, even in a small 
way, that builds up. And that wears you down. 
#MeToo has been highly effective in bringing to the fore exactly these kinds of 
experiences and the on-going work this requires from women to continually make 
judgements about safety and risk in public and private interactions.  
 #WhyIDidntReport, a hashtag which emerged in response to Donald Trump’s 
dismissal of sexual assault allegations against his Supreme Court nominee Brett 
Kavanaugh, has further extended this conversation. The #WhyIDidntReport 
responses have, amongst other things, pointed to the myriad ways in which women 
internalise men’s sexual entitlement to their bodies and accept responsibility for 
men’s sexual arousal. This equation of women with sex makes speaking out about 
sexual violence doubly hazardous for women as it simultaneously, and at times 
contradictorily, positions us as victims and as sexual temptresses, bearing the 
responsibility (and, so, shame and guilt) for sex, but none of the desire. In this 
context, it should not be surprising that many women marginalise the public 
significance of the sexual assaults they experience (e.g. by not reporting) whilst 
internalising the impacts of these assaults. These accounts also provide compelling 
evidence that just because something is experienced or recognised by 
victim/survivors to be sexual, does not mean it is necessarily experienced as 
pleasurable. Women have a lot of sex they do not want and do not enjoy, and do so 
for a variety of reasons ranging from explicit force to gendered-expectations of 
appropriate behaviour: this is the continuum of choice and coercion. 
 
It is equally important to note that Kelly’s continuum is about establishing 
connections, not about stating equivalence. Some of the popular backlash against 
#MeToo has distorted this aspect of the argument to suggest that feminists are 
incapable of telling the difference between unwanted – or intrusive - sexual touching 
and rape. In a longer discussion of the use of the continuum in feminist theory (Boyle 
2018), I have argued that this is why it is important to think of continuums in the 
plural. So, for instance, the continuum of choice and coercion in heterosexual 
interactions which Anitha and Gill refer to above, may intersect with but is not 
identical to a continuum of sexual violence which brings together women’s 
experiences of non-consensual activity. What I refer to as continuum thinking in 
feminist theory should be precisely about establishing connections which allow us to 
see broader patterns: it is not about suggesting that different experiences on the 
continuum are equivalent. This approach allows us to see the contexts in which 
(hetero)sex and violence are inter-related, without conflating one with the other. Thus 
we don’t have to replace violence-not-sex with sex-is-violence: we can rather 
understand the violence that is made of sex as different points on a continuum which 
opens up a critique of heterosex in patriarchy without insisting that heterosex is 
always and only violence.  
 
Continuum thinking, then, is about seeing connections (not equivalences), and it 
should also be distinguished from analogous thinking. Ironically, as MacKinnon was 
so influential in putting the sex back into sexual violence in feminist theory, some of 
her subsequent work has sought to make more analogous connections. She has, for 
instance, argued for conceptualising rape as torture (1993) and she is not alone in 
this approach, with other feminist scholars making compelling connections between 
global terrorism and domestic abuse (see, for example, Pain 2012, 2014). However, 
situating rape and domestic abuse – most commonly experienced by women in 
private - in relation to hostage-taking, torture and terrorism runs the risk that 
women’s experiences of male violence can only be recognised analogously when 
they can be related to experiences of violence in which victims are not, typically, 
targeted because of their gender. As Clare McGlynn (2008) notes in relation to 
MacKinnon’s rape-as-torture argument, there is also a danger that using such 
extreme analogies disguises or minimises experiences of male violence which do not 
cause explicit or long-term injury or fear. This can also make women more reluctant 
to name or report their own experiences if these did not also involve explicit physical 
violence or injury (Gavey 2005): precisely the problem which feminist critics have 
observed with the violence-not-sex position. There is an additional paradox inherent 
in this analogous thinking in that it risks making men’s violence against women most 
visible when its gendered dimension is denied and when it looks most like men’s 
own experiences of extreme violence (also Nayak and Suchland 2006, p.472, 
Cameron 2018). 
 
Finally, it is also significant to note that Kelly always envisaged continuum thinking 
as applicable to men’s behaviour as well as female experience, to allow us to 
explore and expose the inter-relationships between what is constructed as “normal” 
and “aberrant” for men (Kelly 1988, p.75) as also suggested in the quotation from 
RW Connell at the beginning of this section. I have already noted how, in his initial 
response to sexual assault allegations, Harvey Weinstein drew on precisely this 
notion of a continuum of more or less acceptable behaviour to claim that he 
misunderstood where to draw the line. This allowed him to suggest that his crime 
was one of sexual misreading rather than criminal violence. This has been a fairly 
common response from high-profile men accused of sexual harassment and assault 
(and their defenders) in this period: to refute the abusive nature of their behaviour by 
insisting that it was simply the norm in a particular time period, work context or social 
group. And on this point, there is a certain agreement between feminists and sexual 
violence apologists. What Weinstein and feminist theorists arguably share is an 
understanding that his behaviour was not inappropriate according to patriarchal 
logic, but rather an expression of what men are promised, what they are continually 
told about their position in the sexual order. Of course, where Weinstein and feminist 
theorists differ is in what responsibility we think individual men should bear for this. 
That rape is a system which benefits all men – as Brownmiller argued - does not 
mean that individual men are not responsible for their own behaviours within the 
wider conducive context provided by rape culture.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
As this chapter has demonstrated, how we think about the sex and the violence of 
sexual violence remain vexed questions for feminism. However, that there are 
different approaches to these questions does not mean that we cannot extract some 
broad principles.  
 
First, feminist activism, research and thinking around sexual violence and rape has 
always aimed to transform women’s lives and this means that it must respond to the 
wider contexts in which sexual violence and rape is (mis)understood. The violence-
not-sex (or, relatedly, power-not-sex) position which originated in feminist thinking 
has fulfilled a particular function in contexts where to acknowledge the sexual has, in 
common practice, meant a simultaneous denial of the violence. That this position 
has never entirely gone away, despite well-documented limitations, should not be 
surprising, as the sex-not-violence frame it was reacting against has also persisted.  
 
However, the sex of sexual violence has long been a feminist concern: how rape and 
sexual assault are experienced and understood are contingent on “what has been 
made of sex”, to use MacKinnon’s helpful formulation. A second principle of feminist 
work in this area can therefore be identified as a recognition that sexual assault is 
never experienced in a vacuum. A third principle which follows from this is that the 
contexts which are most salient to understanding specific instances of rape and 
sexual assault will vary. This is enshrined in what I have, following Kelly, called 
continuum thinking: the feminist push to see the ways in which different aspects of 
women’s experiences are linked, without insisting on false equivalences between 
them.  
 
Finally, the arguments outlined in this chapter point to the need for ongoing action on 
multiple fronts. Justice for women within the criminal courts remains important, but 
an exclusive focus on the criminal justice system or other forms of legal or 
institutional redress does not allow us to see the whole picture of rape and sexual 
assault. One size does not fit all, but what should remain consistent across feminist 
approaches is an understanding of how rape and sexual assault function within a 
gendered social order. If the meaning of rape and sexual assault is indivisible from 
“what has been made of” heterosex, it is equally bound up in “what has been made 
of” gender. This must also be accompanied by a commitment to recognising the 
diversity of women’s experiences even as we acknowledge their common 
characteristics, and a determination to both support victim/survivors and challenge 
perpetrators.  
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